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Abstract 
With the increasing number of cross-broader transactions (CBT) that are facilitated by China UnionPay 
(CUP), international cardholder disputes are receiving more attention. However, according to a 
recently released internal statistic report, only a very small fraction was satisfactorily resolved from the 
cardholders’ perspective. Unresolved disputes not only bring unavoidable financial loss to the 
cardholders, but have significant implications for CUP’s efforts in promoting CUP-enabled CBT in 
international environments. Using a case study approach with semi-structured interviews, we present a 
conceptual framework for CBT Dispute Resolution. The conceptual framework specifies possible 
determinants and their relationships, and proposes that CUP’s weakness in its international presence, 
influence, governance, and relationships results in a high level of unresolved disputes. 
 
Keywords: China UnionPay, Cross-border transactions, social network theory, content analysis, case 
study. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the launch of the China UnionPay (CUP) scheme, the volume of bank-card cross-border 
transactions (CBT) via CUP continues to soar due to its global marketing programme. According 
tofigures released by CUP, its CBT spans more than 150 countries and regions with 26 million vendors 
worldwide (China UnionPay, 2015a). A similar trend has been witnessed in its transactions, during the 
the 2015 Spring Festival – a key cultural event involving the gift-giving of money, the amount of CBT 
rose more than 50% compared to the previous year (Wu, 2015) and even increased by 36% for the 
National Day Holidays (China UnionPay, 2015b). 
However, disputes for CBT have increased as well with a comparatively low rate for satisfactory dispute 
claims1. These unsatisfied disputes directly cause considerable financial losses for cardholders and 
tarnish the issuers and CUP’s image. This is a significant problem given CUP’s popularity and 
promotional endeavours. This phenomenon is more obvious for city commercial banks, which represent 
one type of bank in China’s three-pillar banking system. Unlike the state-holding bank (i.e. Industry and 
Commercial Bank of China, and China Construction Bank) and the joint-stock commercial bank (i.e. 
China Merchant Bank, and China Everbright Bank) which have much higher net worth in assets and a 
more expansive network coverage, more established infrastructure, and richer experience in operation, 
the city commercial bank is generally smaller in scale, localised and perceived less efficient in 
management (Martin, 2012). Being another main provider of CUP bank card issues, the city commercial 
banks inevitably have to deal with the increasing CBT disputes as its Chinese customers are increasingly 
travelling abroad with CUP bank card payments due to its convenience, increasing worldwide 
acceptance and low cost (Goldman Sachs, 2015). 
This worrying trend has therefore sparked a barrage of attention from the banking sector as banks set up 
their own dedicated department/divisions to tackle CBT disputes with the CUP international operations 
entities. However, regardless of this significant phenomena, there is frustratingly little scholarly 
systematic exploration for satisfactory and effective cardholder protection. This may be due to the 
majority of research into bank card transaction dispute focus on the banking systems and legal issues 
for how it arises and how it can be solved. Few studies have been initiated to examine the possible 
factors that affect dispute resolution particularly in the international domain. Regardless of the low rate 
of CBT dispute resolution, there are no visible efforts by CUP to rectify this matter. We thus have a 
strong interest in understanding why tackling CBT dispute is difficult. 
However, we have not possessed adequate detailed information about the situation of CBT dispute 
processing governance as well as what factors may affect its actual resolution in its industry practice. 
Considering this insufficiency, we aim at mapping out the conceptual model of the phenomenon from 
an academia perspective. Taking a single case study as a first step, we set out the research questions 
concisely but profoundly: (1) generally what factors affect the CBT dispute resolution; and (2) 
specifically how do they affect it. 
The article is organised as follows: we examine existing literature in Section Two, where the backdrop 
of the phenomenon and the theoretical framework are briefly introduced. Then the research method is 
presented in the Section Three. We summarise our findings in the next section, and conclude this 
research with limitations and future work after the discussion. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
China’s banking industry has undergone through a series of transformations after the 2000s, which 
shapes its overall landscape. The establishment of China UnionPay (CUP) and of the three-pillar 
banking sector are both amongst the seismic shifts towards a more competitive Chinese financial market 
                                              
1 As indicated by an internal report from our targeted bank 
(Reynolds, 2014). As the only domestic bank card organization in the mainland China, CUP, which was 
founded in 2002, is the official Association for China's banking card industry, and operates under the 
approval of the central bank of China – People's Bank of China (Burck, 2005). It is also the only 
interbank network in mainland China, linking the ATMs of all banks. 
CUP cards can be used in more than 150 countries and regions globally, making it the second largest 
payment network by value of transactions processed, next only to Visa (China UnionPay, 2015a). Some 
CUP credit cards are jointly affiliated with American Express, MasterCard or Visa, and they can be used 
abroad either via CUP or other franchisor’ payment switch. But given the fact that CUP has much lower 
international processing fee and currency conversion fee, Chinese customers are more willing to use it 
for CBT purpose overseas (Wang, 2011). 
Together with state-holding banks (SHB), and joint-stock commercial banks (JSCB), the city 
commercial banks (CCB) are one of the main issuers of CUP bank cards and promote CUP-enabled 
CBT. Emerging in 1995, CCBs were firstly set up in 35 medium/large-sized cities by merging local 
urban credit cooperatives, rural credit cooperatives and local financial service institutions (KPMG, 
2012). More CCBs were established in almost every major city throughout mainland China thereafter, 
making themselves a key part in providing local financial service. Compared to their national wide 
service network of SHB and JSCB, CCBs by regulations are only able to render relevant service in their 
own administrative regions and in some cases neighbouring regions. A typical CCB therefore is much 
smaller than a bank in the other two types in terms of total asset value and structure, and generally less 
experienced in banking governance (Credit Suisse, 2012). This means that the simplified operation 
structure of CCB is able to rule out other managerial factors that are less connected but may complicate 
our research scenario. We thus believe that CCB offers a thought-provoking window into CBT disputes 
that are dynamic in nature but inadequately understood in theory. 
Few research so far has been conducted to examine bank card transaction disputes, which is generally 
viewed as sporadic and patchy. Extant research addressing this concern is generally conducted from 
either a legal or technical perspective. While the former focuses on the legal system and/or customer 
protection regulations that a customer utilise (Fang, 2014; Morris & Korosec, 2005), the latter 
concentrates on the processing systems where disputes physically occur (Chen, 2012). These attempts 
do shed light on how banks can avoid disputes (i.e. system re-configuration and upgrade) and how 
customers can solve the problem (i.e. legal protection), but before jumping to the solution to these 
disputes, they ignore the fact that we do not possess adequate understanding on what affects the dispute 
resolution, suggesting their research failed to explain the nature of this phenomenon. 
Furthermore, generally there are three typical types of disputes: (1) due to processing error; (2) due to 
fraudulent usage; and (3) due to ignorance/negligence of the customer (China UnionPay, 2011). The 
nature of handling each dispute is different, but previous research did not differentiate the type and put 
all disputes into a single discussion. This is to say the practicability of their outcomes is limited. In 
contrast, our study here is only on the first type. In addition, with CBT becoming increasing popular, 
the findings from previous research, which only relates to domestic disputes, cannot be directly used in 
the international context – an understudied area. More importantly, whenever dispute is concerned, we 
would argue that at least several parties (i.e. cardholder, issuer, acquirer, franchisor, etc.) are involved. 
While cardholder refers to the person who holds and uses the card in the payment, the issuer relates the 
bank or company who issues the payment card to the cardholder and the acquirer the bank or company 
who acquires and settles the payment transaction to the merchant in paying funds to the merchant and 
claims back such from the issuer. The franchisor is about the cleaning system and party who will pay 
the issuer and acquirer on a net settlement on the transactions (Slawsky & Zafar, 2005). It suggests the 
previously employed methods and theories, which are linear in nature, are not able to fully reveal the 
core of this issue. 
In order to address the issue with multiple players who constantly interact with each other, we chose the 
Social Network Theory (SNT) as the theoretical framework, through which the research questions are 
examined and discussed. SNT posits that social context can influence the motives and behaviours of 
subjects (actors) and that organisations are socially constructed and are influenced by the characteristics 
and motives of all actors (BarNir & Smith, 2002; Pitt et al., 2006; Shaw, 2006). In SNT, actors are 
embedded in a social context and considers social structure, the existence and type of relations, and the 
strength of relations known as social ties (BarNir & Smith, 2002). An actor’s ties with another actor can 
vary on a continuum from strong (e.g. friends and/or those with frequent interactions) to weak (e.g. 
acquaintances). 
SNT advocates looking at three aspects of relationships between actors in a network (Hoang & Antoncic, 
2003): (1) the content of the relationship, which can take such forms as information and advice, 
emotional support, know-how and business exchanges, as well as reputation elements; (2) the 
governance of the network, which includes trust between actors, power and influence, and threats of 
exclusion or loss of reputation, which in turn influence the richness and depth of the exchange between 
actors; and (3) the patterns of relationships between/among actors, which can include the size of the 
network, the extent to which actors can access links beyond their immediate contacts via the network, 
the type of relationship (e.g. friend, family, business, social versus economic, close versus distant), the 
frequency of interaction, and the duration of the relationship. 
Given that SNT supports the analysis of network at various levels from different perspectives, and 
describes the nature of relationship that exist and the dimensions on which these relationships may 
influence the outcome (Pitt et al., 2006), it provides a useful contribution to understanding the 
understudied but complex phenomenon. We therefore utilise SNT in an attempt to work out the 
conceptual model and possible determinants that affect the CBT dispute resolution with a focus on the 
configurations of technical, managerial, and social factors. 
3 METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Method 
Considering the phenomenon of rising CBT disputes via CUP in a city commercial bank context is 
understudied from a social network theoretical perspective, we utilise qualitative methods within an 
interpretive case study approach (Myers & Newman, 2007). Qualitative research is designed to help 
researchers understand people and the social and cultural contexts within which they live (Myers & 
Avison, 1997). Specifically, in our research, it allows us to understand what social factors affect CBT 
resolution, and how they affect it. 
We follow a single case study method for two reasons. First, as we aim to examine a specific type of 
dispute (CBT dispute via CUP) in order to boundary our analysis for increasing the rigour and precision 
of our conceptual framework and proposed recommendations. At this stage, in view of the nascent nature 
of the constructs we intend to investigate, the scope would be excessively large if we were to pursue 
comparison of several dispute cases. Keeping to one organisation also allows us to a replicable case 
study protocol for reliability (Yin, 2013). Secondly, a key issue with social network theory based 
research is the problem of delineating the case site. As we intend to look at the diverse factors of CBT 
disputes, it makes sense for us focus our research to one case for practicality. 
We follow “between-method” triangulation by conducting semi-structured interviews and content 
analysis of secondary documents (Jick, 1979). Secondary documents refer to relevant documents in the 
subject bank, such as case report and meeting minutes, and external documents, such as correspondence 
between the customer and the banks. We collected data from a major Chinese city commercial bank, the 
issuer (C-bank  hereinafter); as a market leader, the target bank has the most extensive business network 
in its administrative region with the volume of CBT ranking top 5 amongst  144 CCBs2. 
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3.2 Case Study Background 
The cardholder – C-bank’s customer (Mr. B, hereinafter), a gold-card member, has been its active user 
since 2009, and he has utilised various C-bank’s products very often, such as internet banking, mobile 
banking, wealth management service. Due to the nature of his occupation, he conducts frequent business 
trips to several countries, where he always uses C-bank’s CUP credit card and debit card for payments 
and cash withdrawals. 
In October 2015, when withdrawing $1200 cash notes from the ATM of a CUP-supported local acquirer 
(A-bank, hereinafter) in Australia, he encountered an unexpected system failure, which resulted in the 
cash notes not dispensed but the same withdrawal amount deducted from his account when he 
subsequently checked on his account balance. When he called A-bank immediately, he was advised that 
he must contact the call centre of C-bank to formally lodge a dispute and provide full details of the case 
as required. He followed the instructions, and C-bank noted all the details and advised him the dispute 
claim would be worked on within 15 days. 
In an effort to settle the case before his imminent departure back to China, Mr. B visited the A-bank’s 
branch where the faulty ATM was located, but was given inaccurate and incorrect information. Then he 
emailed A-bank’s customer services team and local Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) several times 
to seek further help in his effort to get expeditious resolution, which also turned out to be disappointing 
and frustrating. 
After 15 days, he was advised by C-bank that in a reply to its enquiry request, A-bank declined the 
dispute claim because “the transaction was conducted successfully”. At Mr. B’s request, C-bank further 
sent A-bank a retrieval request, a higher level dispute resolution request than enquiry request, in which 
the A-bank “must” present the supporting evidence for the “successful” transaction as it claimed; the 
response for the retrieval request is supposed to be delivered in 30 days. Mr. B continuously attempted 
to communicate with A-bank, requesting it to respond to C-bank’s request promptly. However, a staff 
from A-bank service team again turned him down, suggesting “he should contact C-bank.” 
As a result, Mr. B postponed his return flight and stayed at Australia for additional period to handle this 
issue while waiting anxiously for the outcome. Considering Mr. B’s circumstance, C-bank coordinated 
with CUP and CUP local representative office in Australia, and requested CUP to contact A-bank for a 
speedy response. After almost one-month waiting, A-bank eventually confirmed to C-bank that it will 
refund the faulty transaction to Mr. B’s account. Mr. B’s experience became the very few cases in C-
bank where the dispute was successfully resolved which hypothetically may be due to his persistent on-
site pressure on A-Bank in person, which typically may not be possible for a travelling visitor, and thus 
resulting in low resolution rate for such disputes. 
We chose this case for our research was out of the following reasons: (1) the cardholder is an experienced 
user, who has been using various products/service of different banks domestically and internationally. 
It suggests that he knew how to make relevant claim to the bank via appropriate means and channels in 
due course. In addition, being an international frequent business traveller, Mr. B is fluent in English and 
Chinese thus we believe his could communicate effectively with the bi-country parties involved. (2) 
Particularly in this case, in order to resolve the dispute, he utilised all possible methods, such as 
contacting issuer, contacting acquirer, contacting franchisor, requesting for arbitration, which presents 
to us the whole picture of the case to be examined. (3) His persistence and continuous pursuit for a 
satisfactory resolution with both A-Bank and C-Bank, indirectly puts a pressure or incentive to resolve 
the case expeditiously and correctly could have influence or changed the behaviour of the two banks or 
its employee handling the case, unlike other cases which may have been left to take its own course at 
the discretion of the two other parties involved. Darke et al. (1998) recommend the choice of this 
representative case for research. 
3.3 Data analysis 
Data was gathered from the following documents: correspondence (emails, and calls) between 
cardholder and issuer, cardholder and acquirer, cardholder and franchisor, cardholder and arbitrator; 
unclassified correspondence between issuer and franchisor; and unclassified documents (working report, 
minutes, and daily memo) from Bank Card Department (BCD) of issuer. Additional data was collected 
through semi-structured interviews with cardholder and some staff at issuer’s BCD. 
Aiming at understanding what factors affect the resolution of CUP’s CBT, we utilise a content analysis 
approach to delve deeper into the data. Content analysis is “a research technique for making replicable 
and valid references from data to their contexts (Krippendorff, 2012)”. The researcher searches for 
structures and patterned regularities in the text and makes inferences on the basis of these regularities It 
connects patterned regularities of replicable and valid references to the data from its context (Myers & 
Newman, 2007). 
The underlying principle for content analysis is that many words of a text can be classified into many 
fewer content groups, where each group contains certain similar words or phrases, and that these groups 
can be compared analytically (Jun & Cai, 2001). It therefore enables us to establish the specific context 
for enquiry, thus paving the way to a richer construction of social-technical realm that a traditional 
method may not be aware of. 
We utilized Nvivo qualitative data analysis software to code all texts from documentations and the 
interviews as soon as the data was being collected. During the first round of data coding, we assigned 
descriptive codes to these documents as well as interviews related, which yielded an initial result with 
the main themes that facilitated the comparison of topics across data source. After this round, we began 
an iterative process, moving back and forth between data and theory to capture what we had identified 
as the most empirically grounded and theoretically interesting factors relating to the CBT dispute 
resolution. 
4 FINDINGS 
The survey and interview data have revealed some illuminating findings, and will help us better 
understand the issues surrounding CUP CBT dispute resolution and its affecting factors. 
 Finding 1: CUP-enabled CBT engagement and governance has its limitations 
Despite the fact that CUP-enabled CBT is increasing rapidly in both value and volume, the engagement 
with CUP for overseas organisations remains limited. In the response to Mr. B’s enquiry, both A-bank 
and FOC wrote: “it also advised that C-bank had initially submitted an incorrect request to A-bank…” 
However, a staff member at BCD of C-bank suggested in the interview that “there is only one type of 
enquiry request within CUP framework regarding this situation, and thus it cannot be wrong”, which is 
confirmed by CUP thereafter. 
Moreover, C-bank previously advised Mr. B that “in order to facilitate your case, you may want to 
directly contact the specialist at A-bank for CUP CBT issues as by regulation the CUP acquirer must 
have at least one staff for relevant issue”. Nonetheless, Mr. B said that “A-bank seemed not know there 
should be a specialist in its own organisation for CUP CBT as it replied that ‘we are not aware of this 
issue’”. It is concluded that in spite of fast growth of CUP business globally, the discrepancy of 
knowledge for CUP CBT between the customers and issuing banks, and the acquiring banks is evident, 
which is echoed by the staff from both C-bank and CUP, who admitted that “the engagement with CUP-
enabled CBT should be enhanced worldwide”. 
A staff from C-bank further advised “the CUP engagement includes its international infrastructure, such 
as CUP systems, and its background technology support of its international transactions, such as enquiry 
and retrieval requests, which are different from other franchisors”. In this sense, the CUP-enabled CBT 
engagement, focusing on the technical scope, is generally limited. 
 Finding 2: CUP’s ability to influence its international partner bank (A-Bank in this case) is 
insufficient and not effective compared to domestic situations 
Mr. B mentioned several times in the interview that “he does not believe that A-bank have had adequate 
preparedness beforehand for the CBT dispute”. The A-bank’s branch staff seemed not to even know 
about CUP and its related CBT, who even provided Mr. B “inaccurate and incorrect” advice. During the 
call he made to A-bank, one of its staff advised that “the enquiry request from C-bank is wrong”, which, 
however, was proved incorrect as well. Furthermore, another staff from A-bank said “this CBT dispute 
via CUP is the only case they have ever encountered”, which is contradicted with the claim made by a 
staff from BCD, who suggested “several cases happened before surrounding CBT are related to A-bank”. 
In addition, A-bank’s reply to both requests (enquiry and retrieval) that were initiated by C-bank via 
CUP was not promptly. 
Being an international cooperative partner rather than member (i.e. C-bank), A-bank is “not directly 
controlled by CUP”. In other words, the ability of CUP to influence its overseas acquirer over its 
transaction processing, resolution response, and dispute handling is generally insufficient or at least not 
as strong and effective as over its domestic members. Furthermore in the international market, 
technology and transaction processing standards adopted by different banks are far more diversified and 
non-standard compared to that used in a well-controlled or standardised China domestic market, which 
makes dispute handling evidence inconsistent and often subjective. 
 Finding 3: CUP’s governance over the dispute rules and its enforcement is insufficient 
In order to market and expand its international business and to maintain a cordial relationship with its 
local partners, CUP set up a special division – CUP International (CUPI) in 2012 (China Daily, 2012) 
to deal with relevant issues along with other international business in main cities across the world. 
Nevertheless, when Mr. B contacted CUP’s local office at Australia, he was firstly advised to contact 
C-bank, and then after he mentioned if there was any other help CUPI may provide, his call was 
redirected to CUP headquarter in Shanghai China. But in the call to its Shanghai office, the staff from 
CUP advised Mr. B that he “should contact CUPI’s local office in Australia or C-bank”. In addition, 
advised by C-bank, when Mr. B requested CUP to contact A-bank to explain the “incorrect enquiry 
check” issue, CUP replied that “he should contact C-bank”, while C-bank advised he should “contact 
CUP or CUPI.”  
These conflicting information provided and back-and-forth futile efforts Mr. B made suggest that the 
existing state of development of CUP’s dispute management is not paced with its rapid growth in its 
overseas business as its staff do not know either what measures it can take to help customer cope with 
CBT dispute or how to effectively respond to customer’s enquiry regarding the dispute. In this sense, 
CUP failed to enforce coherent and consistent dispute operating rules across its entire structure. Further 
it seems that the governance structure and its enforcement is not effective due to either incompetency of 
staff, inconsistent handling, or weak compliance and enforcement according to governance. 
 Finding 4: Regulatory Enablement is lacking 
When dispute occurs, relevant regulations will be easily considered and determined if it happens in 
domestic. For instance, customers may seek help from the China Banking Regulatory Commission, an 
agency of mainland China authorised by the State Council to regulate the banking sector or perhaps its 
own consumer protection agency. However the scenario is significantly different if the dispute comes 
out overseas where cross border legal framework and implement such regulations may be more complex. 
In order to address this concern, CUPI was set up. As aforementioned, however, when Mr. B contacted 
CUP’s local office at Australia, he was firstly advised to contact C-bank, and then after he mentioned if 
there was any other help CUPI may provide locally, his call was re-directed to CUP head-quarter in 
Shanghai China. Seeking local assistance from local FOS did not work either. In the email replied to 
Mr. B’s enquiry, FOS clearly advised him that “FOS cannot consider the dispute because A-bank has 
not provided you with a financial service”. 
It is obvious that it is not easy if not impossible for customer who has to undergo the dispute to directly 
resort help from relevant supervising body or local regulation. The only available way for both customer 
and issuing bank is through CUP dispute procedure, which nevertheless as CUP call centre replied “was 
not legally enforceable but depends on the extent to which the overseas acquirer is cooperate”. As a 
result, a sound and thoughtful regulatory environment, that is able to facilitate the dispute, will serve as 
the cornerstone in the process of CBS dispute resolution, which is currently lacking. Such regulatory 
governance from a country’s regulators may only be effective in the country itself, but will be less 
effective or challenges for implementation for cross-border unless participating banks are bound legally 
by participating regulation and terms which are of strong governance and effective enforcement.    
 Finding 5: Discrete Ties and Continuous Ties exist 
SNT particularly lends support in examining the possible complex relationship(s) between/amongst 
actors, which can be roughly categorised into two types: the discrete ties and continuous ties. It is 
summarised from the correspondence between FOS and Mr. B, and A-bank and Mr. B that both external 
and internal interventions are difficult to obtain because “he is not our/A-bank’s customer”, suggesting 
the relationship (via business exchange) is weak and discrete. The connection between CUP and A-bank 
(via business exchange) can be also viewed as discrete since “A-bank is only one acquiring bank of 
CUP’s numerous overseas supporting organisations.” In contrast, more active interactions were witness 
between Mr. B and C-bank (via service agreement), and C-bank and CUP (via membership agreement) 
as the formal agreements were well understood by each actor. The discrete tie, which takes form in 
business exchange, has indirect governance on each other with less frequent interaction and shorter 
relationship duration. By contrast, the continuous tie, which is established by agreement, has direct and 
influential governance with more effective interactions. In this sense, these two different ties in terms 
of relationship do exist and have influences on the dispute resolution. 
5 DISCUSSION 
We argue that the conceptual framework for CBT dispute via CUP informed by our exploratory 
examination through SNT is as follows. Relevant constructs included in the conceptual framework, 
which emerged from qualitative research undertaken as part of the actors’ interactions, include (CUP’s) 
Engagement (on international infrastructure and technology support), Influence (over its international 
partners), Governance (on its dispute rules and enforcement), Regulation, and Relationship (discrete ties 
and continuous ties) (in Figure 1). 
  
Figure 1. Conceptual framework for CBT dispute resolution 
CUP is a latecomer into the international card payment market. While it has the benefit to learn and 
improve upon the more established Visa and MasterCard operating regulations to the best it can, it has 
not been successful in emulating inter-member bank effectiveness and reciprocity between issuer and 
acquirer on cross border governance and dispute resolution. 
Specifically, we have found from our research that Engagement, illustrating the CUP global 
infrastructure scope and extent, is the outcome of the interaction mainly between CUP and international 
acquirer. CUP’s infrastructure is still developing and its technology support is evolving while attempting 
to gain international acceptance and playing catching up with Visa and MasterCard. The generally 
undeveloped and lagged state has essentially impaired its controllability on CBT dispute resolution. 
Determined by franchisor, and acquirer, Influence on its international partners and Governance over its 
own dispute operating rules and its enforcement, address the outwards and inwards managerial concerns. 
CUP’s influence on international participating partners and its governance on itself and members are 
less effective as it fears that too rigid implementation and strict regulations will counter its effort in 
promoting and expanding acceptance worldwide – a similar situation faced by other domestic brands, 
such as JCB, Discover, and Diners Club, venturing overseas. 
Furthermore, CUP’s penetration into the international market is now primarily driven by card acceptance 
business by international partners acquiring Chinese issuer cards, and as a result less support and 
balanced attention is given by this group of international acquirers on issuer disputes or enforcement for 
the largely skewed outgoing Chinese card transaction. In this regard, its regulation objectivity and 
processing specifications on issuers disputes and implementation effectiveness is driven one way only 
mainly by CUP and its Chinese members, such as CCBs, and thus not by its international acquirers, due 
to the interest of latter-self. 
As external factors, Relationship in either discrete or continuous tie and Regulation enabled by arbitrator 
together reflect the interactions among all interested parties. In some way, Visa and MasterCard started 
their business as non-profit organisations with a key strategy in maintaining strong and continuous ties 
with their member banks, thereby enhancing influence on the operating rules and governance 
development over a longer period. As a result, both issuers and acquirers with CBT participation are 
well guided with their objectivity and fairness to protect and support the development of both acquiring 
and issuing business, which CUP has currently not emulated. 
In summary, Engagement, Influence, Governance, Relationship in continuous tie, and Regulation have 
positive direct/indirect influence on the participating organization behaviour resulting in effectiveness 
of CBT dispute resolution, whereas Relationship in discrete tie has negative indirect influence on the 
resolution. 
As such, the reasons for the state of low CBT dispute resolution are complicated. Technically, CUP 
international infrastructure and its background technology support of its CBT, especially those of which 
are different from other franchisors, are limited and less known. This shortcoming prevents the 
international acquirer from responding to dispute claim in a correct and prompt manner. Speaking from 
compliant aspect, the lack of adequate influence and governance on the exterior partner and interior 
division over its operating rules further results in the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of dispute handling. 
It necessities the need of enforcing its rules from inwards to outwards across the entire organisational 
structure. Considering external factors that are relevant, relationship in two ties affects the outcome: the 
continuous ties facilitate the information flows between each actor, while the discrete ties retards the 
transmission. Apart from that, regulation that can be enabled by arbitrator may also contributes to this 
affair, which cannot be overlooked. 
In other words, the key to the current problem is due to (1) CUP’s weaker international presence and 
governance, which is heavily skewed on outgoing CBT; (2) CUP’s weakness in effectively managing 
the foreign parties to act responsibly and promptly to provide satisfactory resolution to cardholders and 
operating regulations that are consistently executed across its entire organisation; and (3) CUP’s weak 
relationship with its international partners, mainly playing the acquiring role and not “suffering” as 
issuing role, who are thus less interested in changing the process or regulations to support satisfactory 
resolution of issuer disputes. 
6 CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
6.1 Conclusion 
Increasing numbers of customers have chosen CUP bank card overseas because of its convenience and 
low cost. However, CBT disputes have increased accordingly with a disturbing fact that the rate for 
successful claim is low. Ensuring the customers’ rights and interests is one of the most important duties 
and commitments for banks; the low resolution rate incurs direct confidence erosion of cardholders in 
keeping using CUP CBT service while indirectly defiling the reputations for issuers and CUP usability. 
Our research work out a conceptual framework needed in understanding this phenomenon by conducting 
a qualitative case study. The research indicates that three-group factors, which come from technical, 
compliant, and external aspects, result in the CBT dispute resolution. The implications are twofold. 
Academically, not only did us take the lead in map out the conceptual framework of CBT dispute 
resolution, an area that is long-time overlooked but we have also brought up the possible determinates 
that affect the dispute resolution. In addition, we further explained qualitatively how they affect it. This 
serves to contribute to the understudied field. Practically, the research sheds light on the strategy that 
CUP may adopt to better straighten the low rate of CBT dispute resolution by enhancing its international 
infrastructure, improving its influence on international partners, and strengthening the governance over 
its operating rules while taking the influence of relationship and regulation into consideration. It also 
demonstrate to CUP the deficiency in its core business philosophy that keeping its non-commercial 
target, such as international acceptance and recognition, abreast of its commercially-centred marketing 
strategy. 
We believe this cause will change and evolve over time and with increasing customer dissatisfaction, 
which could drive regulatory, organization behaviour or customer behaviour changes. It is important for 
CUP to take early action to improve on this before there are better payment alternatives are available to 
customers and drive customer to switch brand. 
The research does have some limitations. Firstly, due to the geographic reason, we did not have the 
opportunity to obtain the data directly from the franchisor – CUP headquarter in Shanghai and the 
acquirer in Australia through interview but relied on second-source data from them. Secondly, the 
research was based on one type of dispute – card payment dispute, and it is worth noticing that there are 
other types, such as fraudulent transaction dispute, processing error dispute. As a result, our research 
may not be applied to other contexts. 
6.2 Future work 
This case study yielded preliminary results regarding CBT dispute resolution as it put forward a 
conceptual framework with five determinants from external perspective in a qualitative research. We 
expect to find support for each determinant on the outcome during the quantitative phase of future 
research activities. In addition, we intend to further our research from internal perspective as we wish 
to know how current CUP regulations cover CBT between issuer, acquirer, merchant, and cardholder 
and whether this could possibly be the problem for the issue. 
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